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Abstract 
 
U.S. state social spending has increased both as a percentage of national GDP and a 
percentage of the national budget since 1960. Growth in spending across states, however, has not 
been uniform. Those advocating for more conservative spending argue that large social 
expenditure budgets dampen the growth of society as a whole. In this paper, I examine the effect 
that state social spending has on the growth rate of personal income per capita. I follow the 
model proposed by Peter Lindert (2004), who studied the relationship between social spending 
and economic growth at the national level. I examine the period from 1990 to 2007 and consider 
social spending and personal income data for all 50 U.S. states. I find that the level of state social 
spending has no effect on personal income growth, a conclusion which agrees with Lindert. This 
result suggests that state governments could invest more money in social programs at no cost to 
the mean income of its populace. After exploring the relationship between social spending and 
personal income per capita, I consider whether governments have an obligation to spend money 
on social programs by reviewing three perspectives: Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and the 
Catholic Church. Nozick thinks that governments have no obligation to spend money on social 
programs, even if doing so would benefit society economically. The other two perspectives, 
however, hold that social spending is obligatory, regardless of how it affects the economic well-
being of society. These perspectives show that the decision to redistribute money isn’t solely 
based on economic outcomes. 
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Introduction 
 
One important reason why governments spend money is to correct market failures, or 
equilibrium outcomes that aren’t socially optimal. This type of spending usually subsidizes 
positive externalities such as education, in which case the government judges that the optimal 
level of education is much higher than the market would produce on its own. Money that is 
devoted directly to the development of social welfare is called social spending, and adjudicating 
how to finance and dispense such spending gives rise to heated congressional debates every year. 
But what effect does social spending really have on the economy? 
This first goal of this paper is to answer this question using econometric analysis. In 
section 1, I summarize past research into international social spending and economic growth, 
before analyzing previous attempts to delineate a relationship between state social spending and 
economic growth.  In section 2, I give a brief historical overview of social spending in the last 
250 years. In section 3, I explain my methodology. I follow the same approach and use the same 
model as Peter Lindert (2004), who conducted a similar investigation into the effect social 
spending habits have on growth at the national level. In this section I will also discuss the 
specific ways in which my work differs from Lindert’s. In section 4, I present the results of my 
statistical analysis. I test the hypothesis that social spending has no effect on economic growth, 
as measured by a change in personal income, by utilizing data from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
After my empirical investigation, I take up my second goal to determine whether there is 
a moral obligation to help the less fortunate through social spending. In pursuit of an answer, I 
review three schools of ethical thought and how each understands obligations—or lack thereof—
to help the less fortunate. The three sources I examine are John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and the 
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Catholic Church. I chose them because they are prominent voices in discussions involving social 
obligations, discussions which underlie social spending policy. After describing the views of 
each source, I compare and contrast them to reveal their strengths and weaknesses. Then I 
elucidate their standpoints on whether social spending is obligatory. I conclude by sharing my 
beliefs on the subject. I submit that there is an obligation to redistribute wealth via social 
spending, and that the reasoning behind this obligation is rooted in the work of John Rawls and 
Catholic social teaching. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heitzig 6 
 
Part I 
 
1. Literature Review: Social Spending and Economic Growth 
 
The four primary components of social spending are education, public welfare and 
unemployment benefits, Social Security, and public health spending. In any given year, social 
spending typically makes up three-quarters of state-level budgets.1 In this section, I will first 
review past attempts to explain the relationship between social spending and economic growth 
across countries, then explore what has been said about this topic with respect to spending across 
U.S. states. 
There has been much discussion about the effect social spending has on economic 
growth. Proponents of increased social spending say that, on the whole, it improves the well-
being of society and reduces unhealthy inequality, whose long-term effects they claim undermine 
economic well-being. Opponents argue that it diminishes incentives to work, leaves people 
dependent on the government for assistance, and slows overall growth. A third group argues that 
a change in social spending has no discernable effect on the rate at which an economy grows. 
 Historical responses to this question at a national level are ambivalent. Both Korpi (1985) 
and McCallum and Blaise (1987) found a positive relationship between social spending and 
economic growth. However, they are limited in their scope, having restricted their attention to 17 
OECD countries. Fölster and Henrekson (1998) examined 23 OECD countries during a later 
period from 1970-1995 and concluded that increased social spending negatively affects 
                                                 
1 U.S. Census Bureau. January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.census.gov/. 
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economic growth. Some economists are doubtful about the conclusions Fölster and Henrekson 
reach. A year later, Agell et al published a paper in response, which corrected for what they 
claimed were econometric errors, and found no relationship between social spending and 
economic growth.2 Both papers, however, contained two features which make their conclusions 
less relevant to the question I’m trying to answer: 1) they considered only wealthy countries, and 
2) they used taxes as a proxy for government social spending.  
Using taxes instead of expenditure as an independent variable is an entirely different 
exercise and often yields different results. If a consumer’s income decreases, as is the case with 
the income tax, he or she will have less money to spend on goods and services. The decrease in 
consumption will curtail the growth of the economy. Moreover, if a consumer’s dollar doesn’t go 
as far, as is the case with a sales tax, then he or she will consume less, and the same conclusion is 
reached. Considering social spending instead of taxes tells a different story. Governments may 
invest in areas like education, which have been shown to have long-lasting benefits for society. 
Even oft-ridiculed sources of social spending like welfare and unemployment compensation are 
shown to have positive effects on economic growth in the long run.3 Lastly, even if a government 
runs a balanced budget, taxes don’t equal social spending, as the latter is but one component of 
total government spending. 
Finally, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) found a negative relationship between social 
spending and economic growth. Unlike Korpi (1985) and McCallum and Blaise (1987), their 
scope includes a comprehensive list of 53 countries. Yet, their paper, too, masks social spending 
with taxes. However, there are works that have explored the true relationship between social 
                                                 
2 Agell, Jonas et all 1998. “Growth and the Public Sector: A Reply,” European Journal of Political Economy 15: 
359-366. 
 
3 Ostry, Jonathan et al 2014. “Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” International Monetary Fund, SDN/14/02. 
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spending and economic growth. Peter Lindert’s two-volume work Growing Public (2004), 
examines social spending data across forty OECD countries. Peter Lindert belongs to the third 
group that finds no relationship between social spending and economic growth, concluding that 
changes in social spending in these countries over much of the second half of the twentieth 
century had no significant effect on GDP growth. 
Would Lindert’s central finding hold true for the fifty U.S. states? Past findings suggest a 
negative relationship between state social spending and economic growth. Becsi (1996) 
considers the period from 1961 to 1992 and concludes that state taxes have a negative impact on 
growth. Moreover, Reed (2008) examines a later period from 1970-1999 and also finds that state 
taxes that fund, in general, any kind of expenditure have a negative impact on economic growth 
as measured by state income. Yet, again, taxes are not tantamount to growth, even at the state 
level. And as Held (1985) points out, “Taxes cannot be studied in isolation. To the extent that tax 
revenues are devoted to the provision of public services… a state may encourage economic 
activity within its borders with appropriate expenditures.”4 In other words, one cannot truly 
evaluate the efficacy of a tax without considering the purpose for which the revenues it generates 
are used. Social spending and its components are useful because they identify a clear source of 
the spending and the exact amount of money devoted to it. Because they focus on taxes, Becsi 
(1996) and Reed (2008) don’t offer a relevant response to the question I seek to answer.  
To date, there have been few if any investigations into the true effects of increased U.S. 
state social spending on economic growth. Chernick (2010) considers social spending, but his 
model focuses more on relative redistribution across states and whether the financial 
                                                 
4 Agell, Jonas et all 1998. 
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redistribution figures of neighboring states impacts the spending of habits of a given state.5 No 
paper has applied Lindert’s framework to U.S. states. That’s what I will do in this paper. 
While past findings don’t point to a clear answer, Figure 1 sheds some light on the 
relationship between state social spending and economic growth. The individual points reflect 
social spending and personal income values for states between 1990 and 2007. Moving from left 
to right, one notices no discernable trend in the data (correlation coefficient of -0.03); personal 
income growth does not change with an increase in per capita social spending. For this reason, I 
will test the hypothesis that there is no relationship between U.S. state social spending and 
personal income growth using data using data I collected. 
 
Figure 16 
 
                                                 
5 Chernick, Howard 2010. “Redistribution at the State and Local Level: Consequences for Economic Growth,” 
Public Finance Review 38(4), 409-449. 
 
6 U.S. Census Bureau 
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Before discussing the data in Figure 1, the methodology of my data analysis, and 
subsequent results, I will first present a brief history of social spending to set the scene. It is 
difficult to put any conclusions into perspective without first being conscious of the history 
which gave rise to the current spending habits of state governments. 
 
 
2. History 
 
Before the twentieth century, the U.S. allocated very little money to social spending and, 
in particular, welfare.7 Instead, the poor were primarily supported through charities run by 
churches. In Britain, the Poor Law Reform of 1834 began to change how countries engaged the 
poor. Increasingly, nations like the U.S. instead turned to government factions to distribute 
welfare. They relied on “indoor” benefits, which required those eligible for welfare to work in 
poor houses to receive remunerations.8 Prior to the reform, the impoverished received subsidies 
or credits without having to maintain some form of employment. 
In the 19th century, the U.S. had great income and wealth inequality, much greater than 
they are at the present. Like England, the U.S. devoted a sizable portion of its social expenditure 
on poverty relief. Unlike England, however, the U.S. drastically increased its spending on public 
education during this time. The effect was astonishing. By 1880, the U.S. had a primary school 
enrollment rate of 90.6 percent, a full 9 percentage points above second-place France.9 The U.S., 
however, did not spend very much on social programs outside of education and poverty relief. In 
                                                 
7 Lindert, Peter. 2004. Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century. Vol 1. 
New York: Cambridge Press.  
8 Lindert 2004 
9 Ibid 
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1880, U.S. social spending was just 0.29 percent of its GDP, a figure which was equal to the 
median of countries which are now OECD members. 10 In fact, U.S. social spending has 
remained at or below the median ever since. Global social spending as a percentage of GDP has 
increased every decade since 1880.11 The U.S. followed this trend too, but did so at a much 
slower rate than the rest of the world. 
So why has U.S. social spending increased absolutely and as a percentage of GDP since 
the eighteenth century? There were a number of contributing factors. First, the dramatic increase 
in life expectancy heightened the need for public pensions. Especially in the twentieth century, 
people were living longer, and a greater portion of the population qualified for public pensions. 
Second, minorities in the U.S. gained more rights and representation on their behalf during this 
period. Before the late 1800s, enslaved blacks and women couldn’t vote, and therefore couldn’t 
politically support spending policies that would alleviate their poverty. Third, the Great 
Depression left people uneasy about their future. To assuage their anxiety, they invested in 
insurance programs which would obviate the next financial disaster from befalling them.12 From 
1930 (three years before the New Deal) to 1960 (four years before the Great Society), U.S. social 
spending increased from 0.56 percent of GDP to 7.26 percent.13 These trends and the resulting 
investments improved the living conditions of many of those in the industrialized world.14 
Since 1960, U.S. state social spending per capita has increased as a percentage of real 
GDP and as a percentage of the national budget. This is partly due to the federal government’s 
increased focus on the state governments’ unique ability to remedy the social issues of the 
                                                 
10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015. 
http://www.oecd.org/. 
11 Ibid 
 
12 Lindert 2004. 
13 www.oecd.org. 
14 Lindert 2004. 
Heitzig 12 
 
citizens it represents. Increasingly, the federal government is allowing states the freedom to 
expand or modify federal programs to fit the needs of their populaces. Hence, government 
transfers have also increased over this time period. But how effective are state governments at 
spending these extra resources on social endeavors? In the next section, I describe how I will 
answer this question using empirical analysis. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To investigate what effect state social spending has on economic growth, I will follow the 
approach of Lindert (2004). He assumes that there is a nonlinear relationship between GDP 
growth and social spending. He considers the quadratic and cubic forms of social spending. 
Anticipating heteroskedasticity, he runs a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression. His 
regression equations aren’t based on any theoretical model. Instead, he includes “familiar 
determinants of the level or growth of GDP,” that is, nonhuman and human capital, 
macroeconomic factors like the inflation rate and unemployment rate, and lagged variables to 
capture the effect of past capital investments and GDP. 
Economic theory suggests that GDP and social spending interact simultaneously with one 
another, that is, GDP can explain the variation in social spending and social spending can explain 
the variation in GDP. To correct for this, Lindert uses two-stage least squares estimation to 
isolate the impact GDP might have on social spending. In the first stage, he predicts social 
spending using its traditional determinants and the determinants of GDP. In the second stage, he 
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regresses the log of GDP growth on the predicted cubic form of social spending. His regression 
equation is summarized as follows:  
 
uXBdingnSspeBdinggnSspeBdingnSspeBBthCapitaGrowGDPLog  4
3
3
2
210 ˆˆˆ)/(
where  
ksSupplyshocacksDemandsshoamentUnivEnrolla
EnrollmentaCapitaltenaCapitalallGDPshortfaaaX
765
4320


 
 
GDP/CapitaGrowth is the growth rate of per capita GDP. GDPshortfall is the per capita GDP of 
the economy ten years earlier, measured in real dollars, Capital is the investment per capita in 
the previous year, Capitalten is the investment per capita ten years earlier, Enrollment is the 
primary and secondary school enrollment, and UnivEnrollment is the university enrollment ten 
years earlier. Lindert defines demand shocks as inflation less unemployment, and supply shocks 
as inflation plus unemployment. He defines Sspending as the aggregate of education spending, 
social security spending, public health spending, and welfare, unemployment compensation, and 
housing subsidies. dingnSspeˆ  is the predicted value of social spending, which Lindert uses as an 
instrumental variable to correct for endogeneity. Every social spending variable is measured in 
real dollars per person. 
 When applying Lindert’s methodology to the fifty states, several problems arise. Primary 
and secondary enrollment rates are homogenous across the states and across time: every state had 
close to 100 percent primary and secondary enrollment each year. For this reason, I drop them 
from my model and only include the university enrollment, which is not homogenous across 
states. I could not find university enrollment data before 1990, which limited the scope of my 
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regression. As noted above, Lindert defines supply shocks as the sum of inflation and 
unemployment, and demand shocks as the difference between the two. I could only find inflation 
data every five years, and the data that was available was fairly consistent across states. Thus, I 
decided not to include inflation in my model. Unemployment is in my model, however, as there 
is ample unemployment data by state. State GDP figures are available beginning in 1963; but 
there is a discontinuity in the data at 1997, when the data switched from SIC industry definitions 
to NAICS industry definitions.15 Because of this discontinuity, I use personal income instead of 
GDP. Personal income, which has been tracked since the 1940s, is also a more accurate measure 
of the functional wealth of a given person.  
I follow Lindert and assume that there is a nonlinear relationship between economic 
growth (personal income, in my model). By virtue of the data availability and the nature of 
particular variables, I estimate the following regression equation: 
 
ugGrossInvLaLogBGrossInvLogBmentUnivEnrollBntUnemploymeB
SSpendingBSSpendingBSSpendingBcLagPersonalInBBcGrowthPersonalIn


)()( 8765
3
4
2
3210
 
where the dependent variable is the growth of personal income, Sspending is per capita social 
spending in nominal U.S. dollars, Unemployment is the state unemployment rate, 
UnivEnrollment is the percentage of a given state’s population that is enrolled at a four-year 
                                                 
15 The BEA website notes, “The NAICS-based statistics of GDP by state are consistent with U.S. gross domestic 
product (GDP) while the SIC-based statistics of GDP by state are consistent with U.S. gross domestic income 
(GDI). With the comprehensive revision of June 2014, the NAICS-based statistics of GDP by state incorporated 
significant improvements to more accurately portray the state economies. Two such improvements were recognizing 
research and development expenditures as capital and the capitalization of entertainment, literary, and other artistic 
originals. These improvements have not been incorporated in the SIC-based statistics. In addition, there are 
differences in source data and different estimation methodologies. This data discontinuity may affect both the levels 
and the growth rates of GDP by state. Users of GDP by state are strongly cautioned against appending the two data 
series in an attempt to construct a single time series for 1963 to 2013.” 
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college or university, and GrossInv is a state’s gross investment. The two lagged variables are 
data from ten years earlier. I included, but did not list for obvious spatial constraints, 49 dummy 
variables to account for idiosyncrasies across states. Finally, u is the error term of the population 
model. 
This paper considers the period from 1990 to 2007 for two main reasons. First, this 
period is known as the Great Moderation because there were relatively few major shocks in the 
international economy. Second, I lack the data to examine an earlier time period. Annual 
university enrollment rates only date back to 1990. Before then, they were collected every five 
years. I measure seven variables for all fifty states over a 17-year period, which provides me with 
5,950 observations. 
Table 1 contains summary statistics for each variable in my model. 
 
Table 1 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal Income Growth 4.4% 2.5% ̶  11% 36% 
Personal Income Lag  $17,006.80   $5,220.02   $7,017.06   $35,734.78  
Social Spending per Capita  $2,037.43   $1,088.88   $689.95   $5682.29  
Unemployment Rate 5.1% 1.4% 2% 11% 
University Enrollment Rate 5.6% 0.9% 4% 10% 
Gross Investment  $13,214.48  $19,104.45    ̶  $524.21  $165,958.50  
Gross Investment Lag  $8,694.68  $12,041.56  ̶  $1,534.09  $105,442.00  
 
 
The ranges and values for each variable are realistic. The mean annual growth in personal 
income from 1990 to 2007 was 4.4 percent. There are two outliers in the data for personal 
income growth: Louisiana in 2005 (-11 percent) and Louisiana in 2006 (36 percent). Hurricane 
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Katrina is responsible for these atypical values. It struck Louisiana’s coastline in 2005, and the 
resulting recovery is seen in the 2006 data. The four highest unemployment rates belong to West 
Virginia in the early 1990s. It was during this period that the coal miners went on strike, which 
severely decreased coal output and employment.16 The mean university enrollment rate during 
this period was 5.6 percent.  The highest university enrollment rate was 9.8 percent posted by 
Arizona in 2007. Arizona is home to the highest-attended on-campus university in the country 
(Arizona State University) and has two of the most popular online universities (University of 
Phoenix and Grand Canyon University). 17 Arkansas recorded the lowest university enrollment 
rate at 3.9 percent. 
Over this time period, the mean social spending per capita was $2,037.43 per year. The 
state with the lowest social spending per capita was Florida in 1990, while the highest was 
Alabama in 2004. National social spending per capita rose each year in the period. The same 
cannot be said of national personal income growth, which although positive for every year, was 
fairly inconsistent.  
 
 
4. Empirical Testing and Results 
 
My primary hypothesis is that Log(Social Spending) has no effect on the growth of 
personal income – that is, that its coefficient is equal to zero. The Breusch-Pagan test indicated 
that my model was guilty of heteroskedasticity, so I ran a GLS regression. I also corrected for 
                                                 
16 Ronald Smothers, “Union Prepares for Long Strike at Coal Mines.” New York Times, February 6, 1993. 
17 U.S. Department of Education (USDE). January 1, 2015. Accessed January 14, 2015. http://www.ed.gov/. 
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potential endogeneity by running a two-stage least squares in conjunction with the GLS 
regression. The results for this regression are included in Table 2. I found that dingnSspeˆ is 
statistically insignificant; thus, there is not robust statistical evidence of a correlation between 
social spending and growth of personal income. In addition, its small coefficient ( 0.00003) 
suggests that even if there did exist a statistically significant relationship between social 
spending and personal income growth, it wouldn’t have many real-world consequences. In a 
word, the relationship between the two variables lacks practical and economic significance. It 
stipulates that a $100 change in social spending should correspond with just a 0.3 percentage 
increase in person income growth. Note that this example makes use of a coefficient that is not 
statistically significant, so one cannot assume a relationship of any kind in the first place. 
 
Table 218 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita Income 
Variable GLS Regression Variable GLS Regression 
Log(PersonalIncLag) - 0.12*** PersonalIncLag - 0.02*** 
dingnSspeˆ  - 0.00003 dingnSspeˆ  0.00003 
2ˆdingnSspe  8.16e
-9 2ˆdingnSspe  3.3e
-8 
3ˆdingnSspe  - 1.25e
-12 3ˆdingnSspe  3e
-12 
Unemployment - 0.48*** Unemployment - 0.38**** 
UnivEnrollment 0.36 UnivEnrollment - 0.86* 
Log(GrossInv) 0.02*** GrossInv 8.9e-7*** 
Log(GrossInvLag) 0.004 GrossInvLag - 6.04e-7* 
 
 
                                                 
18 Note that one star indicates significance at the 10% level, two at the 5% level, and three at the 1% level. The R2 
for all regressions were between 0.09 and 0.11. 
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Furthermore, I found that the unemployment rate has a significant negative effect on 
growth of personal income. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is 
expected to decrease personal income growth by almost a half a percentage point, according to 
the first regression in Table 2. The university enrollment rate has no discernable effect on 
personal income growth. Capital investment has a positive impact on personal income growth, 
but the lagged investment variable appears to be uncorrelated with personal income growth. 
These findings agree with traditional neoclassical growth models, which frequently use factors 
like employment and capital to explain economic growth.19  
  
 
5. Empirical Conclusions 
 
 My statistical analysis verified what neoclassical growth theory says about the 
determinants of economic growth, namely, that capital investment positively affects growth and 
unemployment negatively affects it. My findings also accord with those of Lindert. After 
attacking the problem from multiple angles, I discovered no economically meaningful or 
statistically significant relationship between social spending and personal income growth. This 
finding is important because state governments could be investing more in their citizens at no 
cost to mean personal income. As mentioned in the introduction, there are many social 
institutions for which the optimal level of consumption is higher than the outcome that the 
                                                 
19 “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” by Kenneth Arrow (1962) talks about the 
importance of invention and research and development programs. Another 1962 paper by Arrow, “The Economic 
Implications of Learning by Doing,” allows for changes in the efficient capital-labor ratio by assuming that 
individuals can become more productive over time through experience and education. These two papers, and others, 
inspired neoclassical models augmented with human capital like Mankiw et al (1992), and endogenous growth 
theory beginning with David Romer in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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efficient market delivers. Governments should invest in these causes without fear of stunting the 
growth of society as a whole. 
 
 
Part II 
 
Is there a moral obligation to redistribute wealth via social spending? 
 
U.S. state social spending has no effect on economic growth, but this fact does not entail 
society ought to redistribute wealth. To determine whether there is an obligation to redistribute 
wealth, it is necessary to ask a more specific question: Do individuals have an obligation to help 
the less fortunate? I will now consider three responses to this question: Robert Nozick, John 
Rawls, and Catholic social teaching. First, I will explain the views and arguments of the 
perspectives. Second, I will analyze them, providing comments and critiques they may have of 
the others. Third, I will connect their philosophies with my findings on social spending and 
economic growth. Finally, I will offer my own response to the question. 
 
 
Robert Nozick 
 
Robert Nozick (1938 – 2002) was an American philosopher and Harvard professor in the 
second half of the twentieth century. His book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, published in 1974, 
had a profound impact on the study of political philosophy. In many ways, Anarchy, State, and 
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Utopia is a critique of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, though, in addition, it contributed much 
to the discipline of philosophy. 
Nozick was influenced deeply by the work of John Locke. His theory utilizes Locke’s 
notions of the state of nature and the law of nature. Locke defines the state of nature as the 
hypothetical condition wherein “men are perfectly free to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions, in any way they like, without asking anyone’s permission—subject only to the 
limits set by the law of nature”.20 The law of nature states that no one may harm another in “life, 
liberty, health, or possessions”.21 Following Locke, Nozick begins by assuming that individuals 
have rights in the state of nature guaranteed to them by the law of nature. The obligations the law 
of nature entails are negative: they morally bind individuals to not behave in certain ways. 
Therefore, in Nozick’s eyes, individuals do not have an obligation to help others in any positive 
way. Eventually, he argues that a state which redistributes wealth to assist those in need is 
morally impermissible, as the taxation used to finance the redistribution infringes upon a 
person’s right to his earnings. Hence, Nozick would say there exists no moral obligation to help 
the less fortunate. 
In the state of nature, there will inevitably be instances where people have their rights 
violated. Nozick says people are morally permitted to defend themselves and enforce their rights 
against assailants. They even may demand compensation and exact punishment as far as “calm 
reason and conscience dictate”.22 Not everyone has the strength or the means to adequately 
defend themselves, however, so individuals have the incentive to come together to form mutual-
protective associations. Mutual-protection associations are charged with defending and enforcing 
                                                 
20 Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, chapter 2. 
21 Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, as quoted in Nozick 1974, 10 
22 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 10c 
Heitzig 21 
 
the rights of their members, and to settle disputes between members. These associations would 
presumably work well until there are problems between groups and within groups.23 Which 
members of the association will answer the call to safeguard justice when an individual’s rights 
are violated? And how does an association determine if someone violated another’s rights? To 
sufficiently defend its members, mutual protective associations will hire a police force, and it 
will appoint court justices to settle cases of injustice. Eventually market forces will cause the 
collection of associations in a geographic area to consolidate into a confederation of dominant 
firms.24 The confederation is a sort of state whose prime responsibility is to defend its members, 
as they become unable to do so themselves while abiding by the law. Nozick calls this the 
minimal state, or the smallest state that can be justified given the inviolability of individual 
rights. Citizens may be charged (taxed) for their protection, but the tax is acceptable if and only 
if it does not exceed the money they would have spent protecting themselves without the 
intervention of the state. 
Central to Nozick’s work is what he calls entitlement theory.25 Entitlement theory states 
that individuals have the right (the entitlement) to possess goods which they have obtained justly. 
There are two ways to justly obtain something according to Nozick. First, one may acquire from 
nature something that was not previously owned. Nozick calls the procedure governing the just 
acquisition of goods justice in acquisition. Second, one may receive through trade or by gift 
something from another person, provided two conditions are met, namely, the transfer was 
voluntary and the goods that were exchanged were justly acquired by the persons involved in the 
trade. Nozick names the principle detailing just transactions justice in transfer. Finally, Nozick 
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says people may come to possess something through unjust acquisition or transfer. The 
resolution of these injustices is called the rectification of injustice. As will be seen, these three 
principles are at the center of Nozick’s teachings on distributive justice. 
In addition to the right to possess things they have justly acquired, Nozick argues that 
people have the right to self-possession. Therefore, people are obligated to respect the fact that 
they do not own others (unless one voluntarily submits to being owned by another), and hence it 
is immoral to use or coerce them into doing something without their consent. Thus, for Nozick, it 
is morally illegitimate to enforce most taxes, as the government is using the fruits of an 
individual’s labor regardless of whether or not she approves of it.  
Though Nozick certainly would say that it is important to have a just distribution of 
goods among people, he would disagree with most forms of redistribution. From his perspective, 
the justice of a distribution is necessarily tied to history.26 Whether or not a given distribution is 
just depends upon how individuals arrived at that distribution, that is, upon whether those 
individuals acquired and transferred their goods justly. If a group moves from one just 
distribution to a second distribution by just acquisitions and transfers, then Nozick contends that 
the second distribution must be just as well, regardless of how unequal it may seem. To illustrate 
his claim, he uses the example of then NBA star Wilt Chamberlain.27 Pretend that people have an 
equal share of wealth or the distribution of wealth is just in some definable way. Also suppose 
that Chamberlain specified in his contract that he will only play if each person in attendance pays 
twenty-five cents to see him, in addition to the price of the game ticket. At the end of the season, 
assuming a total of one million tickets were bought, Chamberlain will have gained $250,000 in 
ticket revenue. Nozick claims, assuming that all other transfers were voluntary and that all 
                                                 
26 Ibid 153d 
27 Ibid 161 
Heitzig 23 
 
acquisitions were just, this second distribution is just too, even if Chamberlain’s wealth is 
disproportionate to that of everyone else, and the reason is that everyone who paid (gifted) 
Chamberlain the twenty-five cent surcharge did so voluntarily. 
Nozick doesn’t explain in detail how injustices in acquisition and transfer would be 
rectified. He says that, given an injustice, a principle that dictates rectification would refer to 
history and decide how different the present holdings are compared to how they would have been 
had the injustice not occurred.28 The difference, then, would be paid to the victims of the 
injustices. He does not discuss how the value of goods is decided, who is compensated if the 
victims are deceased, or who reimburses the victims if the transgressor is deceased. 
In sum, Nozick assumes that individuals have rights to life, liberty, health and possession 
as guaranteed by the law of nature. Nozick acknowledges that, because of these rights, 
individuals have certain obligations, but these obligations are negative in nature: people must not 
infringe upon the liberty and possessions of another. Therefore, a person has no moral obligation 
to help the less fortunate, or anyone for that matter. Furthermore, Nozick believes that most cases 
of redistribution are unjust. History plays an important role in the justice of a particular 
distribution: all that matters, given a just starting place, is how a group of individuals arrived at 
its current distribution. To adjudicate disputes and protect its populace, a minimal state 
inevitably arises out of anarchy. This state, Nozick claims, is legitimate because it doesn’t violate 
the law of nature. 
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John Rawls 
 
John Rawls (1921 – 2002) was a Harvard professor and one of the preeminent American 
political philosophers of the twentieth century. Rawls’ main work, A Theory of Justice (1971), 
was praised as the most important book in the field of political philosophy since On Liberty by 
John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. For Rawls, justice is closely tied to the nature of 
institutions, which are public systems of rules that specify offices and positions with their rights, 
duties, powers, immunities and the like. The basic structure of these institutions—that is, the way 
they distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the relative distribution of 
advantages resulting from social cooperation—is the primary subject of justice. 
Before considering the structure of society, Rawls’s separates the right from the good. 
Because the good is defined as the satisfaction of rational desire, Rawls believes there is no hope 
for people to agree on what is good—they will never reach a consensus on questions like 
whether or not Justin Bieber actually is a talented performer, and there is no need to agree on 
such things. Yet he does think that people can agree on what is right and says debate of the good 
should be postponed until individuals have agreed on the right. Individuals, however, can only 
agree on the right if they forget their biases.  
Rawls invites people to imagine they are in the position of free and equal persons who 
commit themselves to inventing the principles which govern the right, which secure justice. 
These persons are behind a “veil of ignorance,” meaning they aren’t aware of their talents, 
intelligence, strength, political beliefs, financial endowments, and behavioral tendencies.29 Rawls 
calls this state of ignorance the original position, and assumes that those in it are rational and 
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mutually disinterested in the lives of others. Of course, he isn’t supposing that people actually 
meet and decide things in this matter. Instead, the original position is a thought experiment used 
to “make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for 
principles of justice, and therefore on the principles themselves”.30 Rawls thinks that the original 
position thought experiment is compelling because discussions of justice often break down due 
to biases (e.g. peoples’ inability to set aside their own political ideologies, relative position in 
society, and talents). In the original position, each person is still seeking a society that secures for 
himself the greatest number of liberties and the highest economic floor possible, but is 
theoretically free from his biases. So how would bias-free, rational individuals structure society 
so as to bring about the greatest amount of liberty and the highest expected personal economic 
payout? 
 Rawls argues that in the original position, rational individuals would choose two essential 
principles of justice.31 First, each person in society should have equal right to the greatest 
scheme of liberties possible, consistent with the same liberties afforded to others. Therefore, in a 
just society, each member would have access to political liberties such as the right to vote, the 
right to hold public office, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and so on, so that the 
greatest number of equal liberties will be achieved for everyone. Second, socioeconomic 
inequalities should be arranged so that they are to everyone’s advantage and attached to 
positions and offices open to all. This principle expresses two important ideas. The first idea is 
related to what is meant by “to everyone’s advantage.” In the original position, individuals don’t 
know their relative economic status in society, and therefore would not agree to any society 
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where inequality could leave them destitute. So, any inequality that does exist should make the 
worst-off group better off than it would be in an entirely equal society. The idea that inequality is 
just if and only if it advantages those least well off is called the difference principle.32 
The second idea focuses on what it means to have “positions and offices open to all.” 
Rawls is worried that if positions were open to individuals based on talent alone, an individual 
with a poor upbringing would be disadvantaged compared to someone with a privileged 
upbringing, even if they had similar levels of ability and motivation. He argues that a just society 
would compensate for this disparity—through things like child tax credits, school lunch 
programs, and better public schools-—so that persons endowed with comparable abilities and 
energy to exercise them should have the same life chances. Rawls also believes that those left out 
are debarred from realizing the tremendous fulfillment that results from the employment of one’s 
natural and crafted talents.33 Social class should say nothing about one’s ability to succeed. 
Rawls finds unjust any institution that precludes individuals from the possibility of obtaining a 
particular position on the basis of social class, even if that institution makes those excluded better 
off. The idea that equally talented and motivated individuals should have equal life chances is 
known as fair equality of opportunity. 
Of the two primary principles of justice, the first, which secures basic liberties, ranks 
lexically ahead of the second, the one that specifies fair equality of opportunity and the 
difference principle. That is, liberties should not be traded for increased wealth or social position. 
Thus, for example, Lee Kuan Yew’s suppression of democratic rights to obtain economic 
prosperity during his reign as prime minister of Singapore from 1959-2011 was unjust by Rawls 
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standards.34 Moreover, the distribution of wealth, income, and social positions must be consistent 
with the basic liberties enumerated by the first principle and with the notion of fair equality of 
opportunity.35 
In addition to requirements for society, Rawls lays out principles for individuals, which 
he calls natural duties.36 Natural duties share no necessary connection with institutions, and 
Rawls prescribes duties which are both positive and negative. An example of a positive duty is 
the duty of mutual aid. This precept demands that people do good for one another if it doesn’t 
come at a significant cost to them. Stronger than this is the duty one has to refrain from harming 
or injuring another, and, in instances that require it, not exacting unnecessary suffering. The 
fundamental natural duty, Rawls says, is the duty of justice. Everyone is required to comply with 
and support just institutions, and when these are in place, each person must do his or her part to 
maintain the existing scheme.37 
The original position is the first of four stages in creating and applying just principles to 
society. After individuals in the original position have made the principles of justice, they enter 
into the second stage, the constitutional convention.38 They must now choose a just constitution 
that reflects the principles of justice and defines the basic rights of citizens. The veil ignorance is 
partly removed at this point: they are now aware of basic facts about their society, such as its 
political culture and economic status, but are still not cognizant of their own position in society. 
Next, individuals enter the legislative stage.39 They veil of ignorance now only shrouds the 
                                                 
34 "The Wise Man of the East." The Economist. March 28, 2015. Accessed April 12, 2015. 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647282-authoritarians-draw-wrong-lessons-lee-kuan-yews-success-
singapore-wise-man. 
35 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 54b 
36 Ibid 98b 
37 Ibid 99 
38 Ibid 172 
39 Ibid 174 
Heitzig 28 
 
particulars about themselves, as good representative legislators remain unbiased. The goal at this 
stage is to enact just laws and policies. Just laws and policies secure fundamental liberties for 
citizens and maximize the long-term expectations of the least well-off group. Finally, the 
individuals enter the fourth stage, the application of rules, where they enforce in specific 
instances the laws they put in place. Here, everyone has complete access to information; they 
know about themselves, others, and society. 
Rawls recognizes that, after this fourth stage, people might experience dissonance 
between what they sense to be just and what they have put in place. If people perceive an 
injustice, Rawls says they can always reenter the original position and alter the theoretical 
structure of society till they arrive at what he calls a reflective equilibrium, where the people’s 
sense of justice matches what they have contrived in the original position.40 The reflective 
equilibrium is an important idea, because societies, as well as humans, are always changing. 
Heraclitus famously remarked, “You cannot step in the same river twice”.41 People are always 
liable to reevaluate their thoughts when some new particular case arises.42 
 Rawls argues that a minimum income—or what he calls the social minimum—ought to 
be part of the legislation of a just society.43 The value of the social minimum should be set to the 
value that maximizes the expectation of the least well-off group, and should be funded by 
transfers. The social minimum ensures that the difference principle is upheld. 
 Rawls believes that a just society follows two fundamental principles. First, it secures the 
most extensive scheme of liberties for each member of society. Second, society keeps positions 
open to all, regardless of social class or any demographic factor and doesn’t permit inequality 
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unless that inequality improves the expected outcome of the least well-off group. Society has an 
obligation to help the less fortunate in two ways. First, it should ensure that those with equal 
talents and enthusiasm have equal prospects at success. And second, it should uphold the 
difference principle by offering the social minimum through transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
Catholic social teaching44 
 
There are many voices in the Catholic tradition. The writers of scripture, the early church 
fathers, medieval theologians like Thomas Aquinas, and popes all have their own narrative, their 
own attempt to articulate their beliefs of God and morality. One must consider these voices 
independently before understanding the Catholic Church’s harmonic response to whether there is 
a moral obligation to help the less fortunate. 
The Catholic tradition in many ways begins with the Hebrew Scriptures. The book of 
Genesis contains two important truths about a life of faith. First, the world is good, including the 
physical world. In the first creation story, God, following each day of creation, looked upon what 
was created and “saw that it was good” (Gen 1:1-31).45 The material world that humans inhabit 
was created by God and therefore has religious significance. Humans are good too, since they are 
                                                 
44 Much of the content in this section was encountered in the following source: Finn, Daniel K. Christian Economic 
Ethics: History and Implications. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 
45 All biblical quotes in this paper are taken from the New Revised Standard Version. 
Heitzig 30 
 
part of creation and are made in God’s image and likeness.46 This understanding of creation 
serves as the basis of many Catholic moral teachings on topics like dignity, rights, and duties, 
which will be discussed later.  
The second truth is that the world God created is a gift to humanity for its use. So while 
humanity’s existence is fortunate, it is not fortuitous: God created a good world and gifted it for a 
reason. The physical world is meant to fulfill the needs of humanity.47 For this reason, the writers 
of the Hebrew Scriptures in numerous sections call people to support those that struggle to have 
their needs met. In Exodus, one learns never to “mistreat or oppress a foreigner,” while 
Deuteronomy lauds the one who “executes justice for the orphan and the widow, and who loves 
strangers, providing them with food and clothing” (Deuteronomy 10:18). The authors of 
scripture recognized that foreigners, orphans, and widows have difficulty obtaining life’s 
necessities. In these writers’ eyes, justice is served when society cooperates in such a way that 
the needs of all are fulfilled, and therefore society does have an obligation to help those with 
unmet needs. 
The fathers of the early church (simply called “The Fathers”) adopted this view as well. 
Ambrose of Milan wrote in On Naboth, “When giving to the poor man, you are not giving him 
what is yours; rather you are paying back to him what is his.”48 Material objects ultimately 
belong to those who are in need of them, and humans are obliged to facilitate the flow of 
resources from areas of abundance to areas of dearth. The Fathers, however, also provided an 
additional argument for giving. They argued that giving was not only just but was also essential 
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for the moral development and salvation of the giver. The rich had the incentive to give in order 
to prove to themselves they weren’t avaricious and, as it were, to earn their ticket to paradise. 
Although the things of the earth should be used to meet the needs of humans, The Fathers 
believed that property ownership was a useful human invention.49 But property ownership, as 
something invented by humans, was subservient to God’s purpose for creation. Property 
ownership, therefore, was acceptable as long as the wealthy shared their surplus with the lowly.50 
Thomas Aquinas endorsed property ownership for reasons of usefulness as well. People 
are more apt to buy or produce things if they are able to own them. Moreover, people tend to 
care for their personal possessions more than they would for commonly owned items.51 Here 
Aquinas anticipates a version of the Tragedy of the Commons. In a world where everything is 
commonly owned, individuals, through rational action, might act contrary to what is best for the 
group as a whole. This same logic also explains why a typical college fraternity is messy. 
Finally, Aquinas backs private property because it eliminates most disputes over who is 
permitted to use certain objects.52 
 Aquinas adopted The Fathers’ understanding of the purpose of an object and took it a 
step further.53 In his eyes, the telos or end of an object is built into it by natural law.54 Therefore, 
natural law dictates that people are obligated to use objects according to their purpose, or to 
fulfill the intention of the object which God ultimately decided. In the case of food and materials 
that are necessary to life, people are morally bound to share their surplus with those in need. In 
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cases of dire and urgent need, for which there are no other remedies and for which death is the 
only alternative, Aquinas even says that it is morally permissible to take what you need from 
others, according to the natural law embedded in the goods.55 It is important to note the rarity of 
this circumstance. Aquinas endorses property rights, a belief that would be inconsistent with 
people’s simply taking out of want or eventual need. 
 Recent popes have echoed key ideas of the tradition. Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and 
John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus reiterated that the right to own property is an important part of 
economic life, but that it is not an absolute right and people are obligated to share their excess 
goods with people who need them. Furthermore, these two encyclicals affirmed what the 
Catholic Church recognizes as the universal destination of goods, the idea that God gave the 
earth to humanity so that each person may have equal access to the sustenance that it provides.56 
Even in today’s complex society, the economy ought to be set up in a way that meets the needs 
of everyone. In Centesimus Annus, Pope John Paul II writes, “The obligation to earn one’s bread 
by the sweat of one’s brow also presumes the right to do so”.57 In his eyes, society must be 
organized to ensure that people, if they work hard, will be able to prosper and meet all of their 
needs, including the fulfillment that comes from hard work. This is possible only if people are 
granted a high enough wage. Thus, John Paul II argues that employers have the duty to pay 
others appropriately for the work that they do. This conclusion does not resonate with the free-
market economic thinking that prevails today, wherefore John Paul II says, “there are many 
human needs which find no place on the market,” but “it is a strict duty of justice and truth not to 
allow fundamental human needs to remain unsatisfied.”58 Even if the market doesn’t dictate a 
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just wage, it is incumbent upon those who do make an ample wage to meet the poor’s needs, 
which also include the opportunity to acquire skills to be a productive member of society. 
 Prior to Rerum Novarum, discussion of human rights hadn’t entered into papal language. 
This and subsequent encyclicals, however, taught that individuals had basic rights to go along 
with their duties. Every person, rich or poor, religious or not, has rights and duties. In 1963, John 
XXIII published the encyclical Pacem in Terris, which contained a comprehensive list of human 
rights. The list is seen in Figure 2 below. The rights John XXIII outlines cover many aspects of 
life, from the right to basic education to just wages and working conditions. According to John 
XXIII, every right has a corresponding duty.59 Thus, while individuals have a right to security in 
cases of unemployment, widowhood, old age, and other external factors, they also have a parallel 
duty to insure others against them too. Consequently, the Catholic Church would say that society 
does have an obligation to help the less fortunate. 
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Figure 260 
 
 
 In essence, the Catholic Church argues that since God gave humans the earth to meet 
their needs, it is everyone’s duty to ensure this happens. The most fundamental need is life. All 
who are alive have dignity, and society must respect it using materials and goods for the purpose 
for which they were intended: to sustain every person. 
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Analysis 
 
This section will compare and contrast the perspectives with one another. It considers one 
source at a time, beginning with Nozick and ending with the Catholic Church, and analyzes them 
with respect to the other two. 
 
 
Nozick vs. Rawls and Catholic social teaching 
 
 Nozick and the Rawls disagree on whether there is a moral obligation to help the less 
fortunate. Nozick, of course, believes that individuals only have negative obligations, that is, that 
they shouldn’t harm another’s person or property. Rawls, on the other hand, believes that 
individuals do have an obligation to help the impoverished, and this obligation is rooted in the 
principles of justice conceived in the original position. Moreover, Rawls argues that individuals 
have a duty independent of institutions to be good to those around them. Although there is some 
overlap between the negative obligations dictated by the law of nature with Nozick and Rawls’s 
natural duties (e.g. do not be cruel to others), any suggestion of an obligation to help others is 
completely absent from Nozick’s writing. 
 Nozick also disagrees with Rawls on how involved a state can be. Rawls’s theory 
justifies a state large enough to ensure that his two principles of justice are met: 1) it secures as 
many equal basic liberties for each person as possible; and 2) it permits economic inequality only 
if it benefits the least well-off group and keeps positions open to all on the basis of fair equality 
of opportunity. But Nozick’s state is limited to what voluntary protective associations can do. 
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Thus, there is no redistribution of wealth or focus on ensuring that people with equal abilities and 
energies have the same life chances. Nozick does agree with Rawls, however, that the state is 
charged with the duty of protecting others and their property from people both inside and outside 
the state. The minimal state retains a monopoly on the use of force and may decide who may use 
it and when it may be used.61 
Nozick is critical of the way Rawls neglects history when determining whether one has 
an obligation to help the less fortunate.62 Rawls is concerned about the status of the lowest 
socioeconomic group and its wealth vis-à-vis the other classes. Nozick wonders whether some 
individuals in that group did something deserving of that lower share.63 He argues that end-result 
principles, like the ones Rawls adopts, only look at the final or present state of the distribution 
and hence are too myopic. They should refer to history, for whether people justly acquired what 
they own is the primary question of distributive justice, according to Nozick. As the Wilt 
Chamberlain example illustrated, movement from one just distribution to another distribution by 
just acquisition and transfers must also be just, even if one person has significantly more wealth 
than everyone else. 
 A point Rawls and Nozick share is the inviolability of human rights. They both believe 
that no amount of expected gains can justify using someone to improve the collective good or 
persecuting them for some end. For instance, Rawls and Nozick would not permit the suffering 
of the child in Ursula Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas”. 64 The 
atrocious conditions in which the child lives are necessary for the greater good of the rest of the 
inhabitants of Omelas. In a similar vein, Rawls, due to the lexical order of his two principles of 
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justice, believes that liberties should not be sacrificed for an increase in expected economic 
outcome or a higher social position (e.g. Lee Kuan Yew-esque tradeoffs are not permitted). 
Though they disagree on many functions of the state, Rawls and Nozick agree that the state is the 
inevitable result of the hypothetical state of nature, and that it has the responsibility to defend the 
rights and possessions of its inhabitants. Beyond these two similarities, there isn’t much overlap 
between Rawls’s and Nozick’s theories of justice. 
 Nozick and Catholic social teaching both assume that humans should be respected. For 
Nozick, it’s related to the Kantian idea of treating humans as ends. For Catholic social teaching, 
human dignity is rooted in the divinity found in humans, who are made in the image of God. 
Nozick and Catholic social teaching endorse obligations such as “don’t steal from others,” “don’t 
hurt others,” and “don’t use others for alternative gain”. Moreover, the foundation of these 
obligations—humanity’s inherent dignity and rights—consists of rather strong assumptions. 
Nozick doesn’t give a clear reason why humans have an obligation to respect others: it’s that 
way because of the law of nature. Similarly, the Catholic Church simply supposes that a loving 
God created humans, and therefore they have innate dignity. As the reader will see later, Rawls 
is highly critical of the strong assumptions at the heart of Nozick’s and the Catholic Church’s 
positions. 
 Nozick doesn’t support the multitude of duties that appear in Catholic social teaching. In 
his eyes, there is no duty to help the others meet their needs—there isn’t even a duty to defend 
another’s rights from violation (though Nozick says one has the right to defend another’s liberty 
or possessions if one chooses). This is the primary reason Nozick disagrees with the Catholic 
Church’s conclusion that there is a moral obligation to help the poor. 
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 Nozick and Catholic social teaching view property ownership differently. According to 
Catholic social teaching, the primary purpose of a material good is to meet the needs of 
humanity, and this doesn’t change if that good is owned by someone. Nozick’s theory doesn’t 
recognize a purpose for material goods. If an individual justly acquired or received something, 
then she is entitled to it, regardless of whether she intends to use it or whether others need it 
more than she does. These same conclusions hold on a larger scale. For Nozick, a state may only 
do what the law of nature permits it to do, that is, enforce and defend the rights of its members. It 
is morally impermissible for the state to redistribute wealth, for it is immoral to take from people 
that to which they are entitled. In Nozick’s eyes, taxation is an instance of forced labor, as it 
requires people to work to afford the payment to the state.65 The only acceptable tax, Nozick 
says, is a surcharge used to defend the state’s members from theft and harm.66 This tax, however, 
must not exceed what individuals would spend for their own defense. On the contrary, Catholic 
social teaching argues that, by virtue of the universal destination of goods, governments are 
expected to do much more than merely defend their citizens.67 They have economic duties, like 
promoting business and protecting against harmful monopolies. They also have political duties, 
such as securing individuals’ right to life, the right to participate in the work of society, and the 
freedom to practice religion and pursue truth. A particularly important duty of the state is to 
insure people in cases of sickness, widowhood, old age, and unemployment through government 
assistance.68 
 The Catholic Church’s view of a just distribution is what Nozick calls a patterned 
distribution. A method of distribution is patterned if it varies along with some natural 
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dimension.69 The Catholic Church argues that goods ought to be given to those in need; hence, 
the redistribution it calls for is patterned according to individual need. Nozick rejects any 
patterned form of distribution. Instead, the justice of a distribution depends on what individuals 
are entitled to, and they are entitled to that which they have justly acquired. 
 
 
Rawls vs. Nozick and Catholic social teaching 
 
Rawls tries to make as few assumptions as possible, and the ones he does make are 
relatively weak, so readers will find them easier to adopt.70 He invites people into the original 
position, where they are unbiased, rational, and disinterested, and supposes that they will create 
the two principles of justice which he conceived. Rawls thinks that the assumptions in Nozick’s 
theory are too strong. It is a significant logical step for Nozick to assume, like Locke, that 
individuals have rights by nature – and who’s to say that Locke is right to assume it in the first 
place? There are many people who would not endorse Nozick’s theory on the basis of that 
assumption, a fact which is problematic considering that his theory of entitlement and conception 
of the minimal state are based on it. Rawls wants to offer a theory capable of convincing people 
of what is just, instead of making strong assumptions which some might not uphold in today’s 
pluralistic society.  
One way Rawls appeals to a pluralistic society is by adhering to pure procedural justice, 
which says that justice is achieved when a procedure is actualized. To more fully understand 
pure procedural justice, it helps to compare it with the notions of perfect and imperfect 
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procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice occurs when there is both an independent criterion 
for what is just and a procedure that delivers the just outcome. Rawls illustrates perfect 
procedural justice by considering a group of people who want to divide a cake among 
themselves. The just outcome is that each person receives an equally-sized fraction of the cake, 
while the procedure for delivering this outcome is having one person divide the cake and pick 
last.71 Imperfect procedural justice occurs when an independent criterion for what is just exists, 
but there is no procedure that delivers with certainty the desired outcome. An example is a 
criminal court case. The just outcome is the defendant’s receiving an accurate verdict; yet, there 
is no perfect way to ensure that this outcome will be reached. Finally, pure procedural justice 
happens when there is no independent criterion for determining a just outcome, but there exists a 
just procedure such that the outcome is always fair. The original position exemplifies pure 
procedural justice: the outcome must be fair, because that’s what people decided was fair in the 
original position. In some cases, however, the outcome might not match what people intuit as 
just. If people perceive an injustice, they can always reenter the original position and alter the 
theoretical structure of society till they arrive at a reflective equilibrium, where the people’s 
sense of justice coincides with the principles of justice.72 While the conclusions of the theories of 
Nozick and Catholic social teaching are weakened when their assumptions are questioned, 
Rawls’s conclusions are at most altered and retain every bit of their original strength. 
By virtue of the reflective equilibrium, if the current scheme of institutions isn’t 
producing what people sense to be just, they simply make adjustments to that scheme. With 
Nozick, when rectifying a rights violation, one has the right to punish the offender “so far as 
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calm reason and conscience dictate” in accordance with the crime committed.73 However, 
Nozick doesn’t explain in depth how to rectify injustices in acquisition or transfer. History is 
replete with examples of such injustices. Practically every community of individuals has 
committed at least one, and many of these have gone unresolved. The only solution to rectify the 
enormity of injustice appears to be a mass redistribution, which is highly impractical. Besides, it 
is impossible to recompense the dead. For Rawls, however, this same problem isn’t as prevalent. 
In a well-ordered society, the orientation of institutions will ensure that injustices are made right. 
According to Rawls and Catholic social teaching, people have positive as well as 
negative duties. Both perspectives hold that individuals have a moral obligation to help the less 
fortunate. They are especially concerned for the marginalized groups of society and agree that 
the state has more responsibility than simply defending its populace. It too must ensure that 
individuals retain a right to political liberties and a certain level of wealth. While Rawls doesn’t 
provide a detailed list of natural rights and duties (although individuals in the original position 
theoretically could) as John XXIII does in Pacem in Terris, he would agree with some of them 
and the basic ideas behind many of them. He accedes that individuals have rights founded on 
justice, like the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, and the freedom of assembly. Though 
Rawls doesn’t explicitly use the same language as Catholic social teaching, he would certainly 
believe that access to basic education and social insurance against injury, old age, 
unemployment, etc. are vital to a well-ordered society.74 
While Rawls and Catholic social teaching share some of the same conclusions, the logic 
behind them is notably different. Individuals in Rawls’s theory of justice have their rights rooted 
in the original position and his two principles of justice. Catholic social teaching makes strong 
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assumptions from the outset. It assumes that people have dignity—and therefore rights—because 
they are made in the image of God. It also assumes the universal destination of goods because 
God gave the world to humans to meet their needs. God plays an important role in the Catholic 
Church’s theory of justice. If one supposed that God did not exist, it wouldn’t make much sense 
to say that people are made in the image of God, or that earth is a gift from God. Doubting God’s 
existence weakens the resulting arguments about helping those in need. Rawls thinks that the 
assumption of rational, disinterested people in the original position is part of a much more 
convincing argument to reach the same conclusion of the existence of a moral obligation to help 
the poor. 
 
 
Catholic social teaching vs. Nozick and Rawls 
 
 While the natural law is an important idea for both Catholic social teaching and Nozick, 
they disagree as to what sort of obligations the natural law entails. Whereas Nozick recognizes 
only negative obligations, Catholic social teaching says that there is a corresponding duty for 
each human right. Some rights, such as the right to basic necessities like food, clothing, and 
shelter, or even rights to higher goods like access to education and insurance against 
unemployment, cannot be met with negative duties. It is insufficient to say that the 
corresponding duty to the right to nourishment is to make sure you don’t steal another’s food. 
Catholic social teaching says individuals have the positive duty to ensure others are fed. This 
point is illustrated clearly in the Epistle of James: “Suppose a brother or a sister is without 
clothes and daily food. If one of you says to them, ‘Go in peace, keep warm and well fed,’ but 
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does nothing about their physical needs, what good is it?” (James 2:15-16). Catholic social 
teaching argues that one must do more than merely not interfere with others’ pursuit of their 
needs, or hope they meet them. Everyone has an active duty to meet their needs, one which is 
rooted the purpose of the fruits of the earth. 
 The universal destination of goods stands at odds with Nozick’s entitlement theory. 
Catholic social teaching says it would be immoral for Wilt Chamberlain, to use a previous 
example, to not share his wealth with those in need. Individuals are entitled to what they own 
only conditionally: the duty to share with the needy is an essential part of the right to own 
property, even if one acquired one’s wealth justly. Not only does the Catholic faith call for moral 
activity like sharing with the poor, but it is in the best interest of the wealthy to share insofar as 
they are concerned with eternal salvation. 
Catholic social teaching is much less concerned than the other two perspectives with 
detailing limitations or responsibilities of the government. While Centesimus Annus and other 
papal documents delineate some key responsibilities and limitations of governments, the primary 
concern is that every individual has rights acknowledged by Catholic social teaching. Thus, John 
Paul II recommends what he calls “fraternal support,” a more localized, communal care that 
encompasses emotional as well as pecuniary assistance. Catholic social teaching calls the notion 
that needs ought to be met by the most localized authority the principle of subsidiarity.75 
For Rawls, the state is an institution that is essential to justice. It creates, dictates, and 
enforces the laws which secure freedoms for its people and help ensure relative social and 
economic equality. By contrast, the Catholic Church puts more emphasis on individuals and the 
natural world. As mentioned earlier, members of society have a right to life and its necessities 
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and have a duty to ensure those rights are upheld for others. Moreover, people are obligated to 
use the material world to help the poor because God intended material goods to be used for that 
purpose—to meet the needs of others. Hence, even though it is important to both Rawls and the 
Catholic Church to secure economic and political rights for people, the arguments they use in 
support of their claim stand in stark contrast. 
To conclude, both the Catholic Church and Rawls believe that individuals have an 
obligation to help those in need. While the Catholic Church’s arguments focus on the individual 
in community with others, Rawls centers on what individuals would choose in the Original 
position. Nozick disagrees with the Catholic Church and Rawls’ conclusion on both an 
individual level and a societal level. He eventually concludes that individuals aren’t obligated to 
provide assistance to anyone, and a state which redistributes wealth isn’t justifiable. 
 Rawls’s argument relies on weaker assumptions than the Catholic Church and Nozick. 
His theory is predicated on what individuals would choose in the original position. Regardless of 
how they structure society, the outcome will be procedurally just. The Catholic Church and 
Nozick, on the other hand, rely on assumptions of the existence of a good God and innate human 
rights respectively to theorize on what is just. Rawls thinks that agreeing to these initial 
assumptions is a big step, perhaps too big for most people. 
 Nozick believes that end-result principles, like those of Rawls, neglect an important facet 
of the justice of distribution: history. In fact, he argues that it is the primary factor in determining 
the justice of a given distribution. While Rawls and the Catholic Church would acknowledge that 
history is relevant, they ultimately conclude that there is a moral obligation to redistribute 
wealth, even if the distribution was brought about via just acquisitions and transfers. 
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 The essential difference between Nozick and Rawls and the Catholic Church is their 
understanding of obligations. Nozick believes there are only negative obligations. But Rawls and 
Catholic social teaching believe there is, at the very least, an additional obligation to aid others. 
This notion of mutual aid is a key element in both Rawls’s and the Catholic Church’s argument 
in support of helping the less fortunate. 
  
 
Social Spending and the obligation to help the less fortunate 
 
 In the first part of this paper, I found that U.S. state social spending had no effect on 
personal income growth. That said, should society continue to devote money to social spending? 
Furthermore, this conclusion, as it was reached by examining one region over a fixed time 
period, is subject to change. If there existed a negative relationship between social spending and 
economic growth, should society still redistribute its wealth through social programs? What if 
there were a positive relationship between the two? I’ll respond to these questions by referring to 
the three perspectives described above. 
 Nozick believes that any social spending is morally impermissible. Social spending is 
financed by taxes, and taxes are on par with forced labor, as individuals must sacrifice a certain 
portion of their hours spent in labor to cover the cost of the tax.76 Nozick more generally argues 
that individuals cannot be used in any way. They have rights guaranteed to them by the law of 
nature, and among these are the rights to life, liberty, health, and possessions. The resulting 
obligations entail people must preserve that which others have a right to, but are in no way 
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obligated to assist them. Thus, a government cannot justify social spending in any of its forms, 
even if social spending made everyone more economically well-off. 
 Rawls advocates a society where the rich can get ahead if and only if they bring the poor 
with them. Social spending is a key apparatus society may use to redistribute wealth to ensure 
the difference principle is upheld. Moreover, for positions and offices to be subject to fair 
equality of opportunity, those with comparable competencies and motivation must have equal 
life chances. Social spending is an important way to ensure that those who can’t afford private 
education, those who are raised a broken home, or those who are afflicted by health problems, 
will have the same life chances as those equally talented and motivated individuals who have 
more favorable life circumstances. Therefore, a just society, according to Rawls, will invest in 
social spending regardless of its impact on economic growth. 
 Catholic social teaching holds that God gave the earth to humanity to meet its needs. This 
end is embedded in the material objects of the world. Consequently, people have a moral 
obligation to fulfill the needs of those with whom they are in community. In addition, the 
inherent dignity in every person affords her the right to higher necessities like access to a basic 
education and insurance against debility, old age, and unemployment. Because these needs 
mirror the most significant sources of social spending, the Catholic Church endorses social 
spending, whatever its relationship with overall growth. It would also emphasize, by the 
principle of subsidiarity, that redistribution be done locally to the greatest extent possible. 
 For these theories, the relationship between social spending and economic growth has no 
bearing on whether or not a society ought to redistribute wealth. Nozick believes that any kind of 
spending that is funded by taxation is immoral, even if it exponentially increases growth. Rawls 
holds that society ought to redistribute wealth to support the least advantaged group and ensure 
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that individuals of equal talent and enthusiasm have the same prospects of success. Finally, the 
Catholic Church argues that people have an obligation to fulfill everyone’s needs because that’s 
what God intended the material world to do.  
 
 
A personal commentary on the theories presented 
 
I find Rawls’s argument to be widely accessible. Anyone, irrespective of their religion, 
political beliefs, or social standing, is disposed to support his theory and subsequent conclusions. 
Nozick and Catholic social teaching make rather large assumptions that many find difficult to 
swallow. But what if I accepted them with relative ease? That is, what if I believe in a law of a 
nature that details obligations for humankind and what if I believe in a loving God who created 
good people and a bountiful earth to meet their needs? 
As it happens, I do believe these things. And these beliefs affect how I personally would 
answer the question of whether there is a moral obligation to redistribute wealth. I accept 
Nozick’s assumption of the law of nature. People have an obligation to not harm others. But I 
don’t think that claim is sufficient. I believe people have a positive obligation to help others as 
well. The inherent human dignity rooted in God’s love calls for more than nonintervention; it 
calls for active participation in the duties stipulated by Catholic social teaching, like feeding the 
hungry, clothing the naked, and sheltering the homeless. Moreover, individuals in the original 
position would not endorse a society Nozick envisions. I agree with Rawls and Catholic social 
teaching that positive obligations are an important component of justice. 
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Positive obligations stand at odds with Nozick’s theory. If people have positive 
obligations, a more extensive state is justifiable. Taxes that fund social spending are now morally 
permissible, as such spending fulfills the obligation to help those in need. I support Catholic 
social teaching’s notion of the universal destination of goods. Therefore, I cannot acknowledge 
Nozick’s entitlement theory as just. People have a right to private property, but with great 
property comes great responsibility: they should use their surplus to meet the needs of others. 
Because I advocate positive obligations and uphold the universal destination of goods, I cannot 
accept some of Nozick’s key ideas as just. 
But just because taxes are permissible and just because people have an obligation to help 
one another doesn’t mean that society has an obligation to spending money on social programs. 
Here’s where Rawls is important. He shows that people in the original position would recognize 
social spending as an obligation. The obligations entailed by the notion of fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle require government to invest in social programs. 
Initiatives that compensate for social disadvantages such as housing subsidies, public education, 
and tax credits are financed through government spending. Furthermore, transfers are the 
primary way governments provide a social minimum. Thus, because governments are obligated 
to put programs in place to ensure fair equality of opportunity and a social minimum, and 
because social spending is necessary to finance these programs, society is obligated to spend 
money on social programs. Catholic social teaching convinces me that there is a duty to help 
others, but Rawls convinces me that society has an obligation to redistribute wealth through 
social spending. 
In my eyes, the obligations to help others and spend money on social programs have very 
few exceptions. I agree with Rawls that one should help another only if it doesn’t come at too 
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great a cost. I don’t believe that sacrificing your life by pushing someone out of the way of a 
moving train is obligatory, though such an action is extremely laudable. There may be exceptions 
to social spending, but one of them is not related to its overall effect on the economy. I believe 
that there is a moral obligation to redistribute wealth via social spending even if it is harmful to 
the overall health of the economy. I side with Rawls that people in the original position would 
reach this conclusion because redistribution will effect a more socially and economically 
equitable society.  
 
 
Final Conclusion 
 
 This paper sought to answer two questions. The first was “How does the level of social 
spending in a given U.S. state affect the growth rate of personal income per capita?” To answer 
this question, I used a regression model suggested by Lindert (2004). I found no statistical or 
economically meaningful relationship between state social spending and personal income 
growth, after correcting for endogeneity and heteroskedasticity. 
 The second question this paper attempted to answer was “Is there an obligation for 
society to redistribute wealth through social spending?” I considered three responses to this 
question, those of Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and the Catholic Church. After describing and 
analyzing their views, I concluded that society is obligated to devote money to social programs, 
even if there were shown to be a negative relationship between social spending and economic 
growth. Ongoing policy debates should recognize the importance of social spending. It has far-
reaching effects in areas from education to health care. One thing it does not affect, however, is 
the growth of personal income. Governments should fulfill their duty to invest in the social 
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programs that have benefited, and will continue to benefit, its citizens without the fear that the 
economy will shrink as a result. 
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Appendix A: What about the level of personal income? 
  
This paper focused primarily on the effect social spending has on the growth rate of 
personal income. But what effect, if any, does social spending have on the level of personal 
income? Although I won’t conduct any econometric test, I wanted to review a simple scatter plot 
and look at the correlation between the two variables. A graph of the level of personal income 
and social spending per capita is shown in Figure A1. Each data point reflects actual state values 
for social spending and personal income between 1990 and 2007. 
 
Figure A177 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 U.S. Census Bureau 
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There is a noticeable positive linear correlation between the level of personal income and 
social spending per capita. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.71, which 
further suggests that there is a positive relationship between the two. Mathematically, this result 
seems apparent given the findings in the paper. The change in personal income is simply the 
derivative of the personal income at a specific time. Therefore, that the level of personal income 
and social spending per capita might have a positive linear relationship should come as no 
surprise. Yet future research could reveal a nonlinear relationship between the two variables. It 
could also elucidate the true relationship between the two, after accounting for the additional 
effects of other variables included in regression models like the ones considered in this paper. 
Such models should anticipate endogeneity, as bigger economies are more likely to spend more 
money (in absolute terms) on social programs than smaller economies. Figure A1 certainly 
reflects the work of time: as states have grown wealthier, they have devoted more money on 
social spending. 
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